The nature of science - What is science - part two

THE NATURE OF SCIENCE - PART TWO

WHAT IS SCIENCE

Of course, we are so far from a single set of laws for all the sciences that we can scarcely go logically from physics to chemistry. We are closer to-though still far enough from-more limited ideas of the unity of science: unity on the basis of terms or of methods. There have been relatively successful attempts to create a common body of terms for the sciences, so that propositions of one science can be meaningful in others. And, despite great differences in the procedures and apparatus of the particular sciences, it is possible to approximate a statement of the most general methods of science so that they are applicable to all science.

Science is cumulative in that present knowledge is based on past knowledge, even when the new supersedes the old. The dullest freshman in an introductory physics course knows more about phases than Aristotle did, not because he is brighter than Aristotle but, among other things, because of the work of Aristotle. Scientific conclusions are held tentatively; if they were regarded as certainly true, inquiry would be terminated and mistakes would be enshrined as dogma. But science is self-corrective; its mistakes are eliminated by more science. This is perhaps the basic criterion that distinguishes science from all other ways proposed for attaining truth: intuition, authority, tradition, for example.

Different intuitions, authorities, and traditions may contradict each other, but each will remain firmly convinced of its own truth. These methods can be corrected only from outside themselves, especially by logical criticism and new evidence. But science is corrigible by its own practice, through continued application of its method. And the recurrent criticism that science is unreliable because it is always changing misses the point.

Science is reliable because its conclusions change in a successive approximation of truth. It does not claim absolute truth for any of its conclusions, but only probability. And at any time we can expect the probability of a scientific law to be greater than knowledge about the same subject from any other source. Further, science does not correct itself only by recognition of mistakes. Solving one problem opens a path to others, and they in turn may lead back to a reconsideration of the earlier problem.

When we learn that something previously called an instinct, for example, is actually the result of cultural conditioning, we promptly ask whether the same is true of other "instincts". And what we discover about conditioning as a result of this new inquiry may lead to greater understanding of the first "instinct".

Of course, scientific growth is not always direct; there are many blind alleys, and errors may last for years. But many errors have worked out well in the end because they led to the study of related problems or accidental discovery of some truth. Examples include the political doctrine of a state of nature, which led to the isolation of specifically social and political characteristics of human behaviour; the theory of humors, which pointed the way to discovery of a relationship between glandular secretions and temperament; and alchemy, which in the search for ways of transmuting other substances into gold helped found the science of chemistry. As Augustus De Morgan, a nineteenth century English mathematician, said, "Wrong hypotheses, rightly worked, have produced more useful results than unguided observation."

Many scientists rule out of court all vague and fuzzy notions. Yet science has often advanced because of, not despite, just such notions when they were bold and imaginative or were metaphors which called attention to a previously neglected relationship. Max Planck wrote:

If a new idea were to be admitted only when it had definitely proved its justification, or even if we merely demanded that it must have a clear and definite meaning at the outset, then such a demand might gravely hamper the progress of science. We must never for get that ideas devoid of a clear meaning frequently gave the strongest impulse to the further development of science.

The idea...of perpetual motion gave rise to an intelligent comprehension of energy; the idea of the absolute velocity of the earth gave rise to the theory of relativity, and the idea that the electronic movement resembled that of the planets was the origin of atomic physics. These are indisputable facts, and they give rise to thought, for they show clearly that in science as elsewhere fortune favors the brave. In order to meet with success it is well to aim beyond the goal which will eventually be reached.

(to be continued...part two)........

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